SERAP's Mandamus Bid Tests Whether Nigeria's Data Regulator Will Scrutinise INEC
SERAP is asking the Federal High Court to compel the NDPC to independently investigate INEC's handling of voter data. A regulator that defers to the body i
Two hundred and sixty-eight records flagged for review. More than 103 million names on the national register. A certification date of 15 December 2026. Those three numbers frame the most consequential accountability question of Nigeria's coming election cycle, and they explain why SERAP's suit at the Federal High Court in Abuja deserves a fair hearing rather than a procedural shrug.
The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project has sued the National Data Protection Commission and the Independent National Electoral Commission over the alleged use of AI-generated photographs by some INEC officials to manipulate the preliminary Register of Voters, and over the failure to protect voters' personal data. The suit, number FHC/ABJ/CS/2863/2026, was filed last week. SERAP wants an order of mandamus compelling the NDPC to make an independent and reasoned determination on the allegations, including whether to open an investigation, and to obtain and examine relevant documents and electronic records in INEC's custody.
The case is less about the photographs than about who gets to verify them. INEC disclosed on 1 November 2026 that its Automated Biometric Identification System had flagged 268 records for review, with some individuals allegedly exploiting official registration credentials. That is a welcome disclosure. It is not, however, an independent investigation. The commission is reviewing its own register, using its own system, ahead of its own certification deadline. No hearing date has been set, and the NDPC has not said whether it has opened any inquiry of its own.
This is where the separation of verification powers matters. A data-protection regulator exists precisely because institutions cannot always be trusted to audit themselves, not because they are assumed to be acting in bad faith, but because the appearance of independence is part of the protection. If the NDPC's position is that it will wait for INEC's internal review to conclude before deciding whether to act, then the regulator has effectively delegated its statutory judgment to the body it is meant to oversee. That is not deference to expertise. It is abdication of function.
The scale of what is at stake is not abstract. Nigeria's national voter register has more than 103 million names after the three-phase Continuous Voter Registration exercise and final biometric cleanup, according to INEC Chairman Professor Joash Amupitan. A register of that size, certified on a fixed date, is the foundation of the 2027 election cycle. If flagged records are resolved without independent scrutiny, the credibility of the entire roll is diminished, not because anything improper has been proven, but because no one outside INEC will have checked.
The strongest case against the mandamus order is straightforward, and it deserves to be stated plainly. INEC's own ABIS review and its stated cleanup before the 15 December 2026 certification may already provide adequate scrutiny. The commission has acknowledged the suspicious photographs, flagged the records, and committed to cleaning the register before certification. Courts are generally reluctant to compel a regulator to act where the regulated body is already acting, and there is a reasonable argument that a judicial order at this stage is premature, redundant, or both. If INEC completes its review transparently and the flagged records are resolved before certification, the case for external intervention weakens considerably.
But that argument proves too much. The question is not whether INEC is doing something. It is whether anyone independent is verifying what INEC does. INEC's review is internal by design; the NDPC's mandate is external by design. The two are not substitutes. And the timing matters: certification is set for 15 December 2026, which leaves a narrow window for any independent examination to occur before the register is locked. Waiting until after certification to decide whether to investigate would render the mandamus order meaningless in practice.
It is also worth being precise about what is and is not known. The 268 records were flagged for review, not confirmed as AI-generated photographs. The review's findings have not been published. The individuals allegedly exploiting official registration credentials have not been publicly identified or sanctioned. The NDPC has not responded to the suit or opened any inquiry of its own. SERAP's allegations are filed, not proven. None of that undermines the case for independent verification. It strengthens it. When the facts are unsettled, the answer is more scrutiny, not less.
The Federal High Court should grant the order. Not because INEC has been shown to have done anything wrong, but because the credibility of a register of more than 103 million names depends on verification that does not begin and end inside the institution that compiled it. A regulator that defers to the body it oversees cannot credibly protect the people on that register. The next thing to watch is whether the court sets a hearing date, and whether the NDPC chooses to act before it is compelled to.
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