CybersecurityApril 24, 20264 min readBy Peter OlaleruEditor

UNC6692 Uses Fake IT Helpdesk Teams Messages to Deploy SNOW Malware

How UNC6692 used fake helpdesk chats on Microsoft Teams and the SNOW malware suite to steal Active Directory data, and what defenders can check.

Updated October 9, 2026

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UNC6692 Uses Fake IT Helpdesk Teams Messages to Deploy SNOW Malware
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A hacking group tracked as UNC6692 broke into a company network by posing as the IT helpdesk on Microsoft Teams, then used a custom malware suite called SNOW to steal the company's Active Directory database. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant described the intrusion in a report published on April 23, 2026. The way in was not a software flaw: the victim accepted a chat from outside the organization and ran the "fix" themselves.

How the lure worked

The campaign began in late December 2025 with a flood of spam emails meant to bury the target's inbox and create a sense of urgency. A Teams chat invitation then arrived from an account outside the victim's organization. The sender posed as IT support and offered to stop the spam by installing a "local patch."

The link led to a page dressed up as a "Mailbox Repair and Sync Utility." Visitors using any browser other than Microsoft Edge saw an overlay pushing them to reopen the page in Edge. A "Health Check" button asked for the user's email password and rejected the first two attempts, so the attackers captured it twice. While a fake progress bar ticked through tasks such as "Checking mailbox integrity," the page sent the credentials to an attacker-controlled Amazon S3 bucket and downloaded a renamed copy of AutoHotkey, a scripting tool, with a script that installed the first piece of malware.

The SNOW malware suite

SNOWBELT is a JavaScript backdoor delivered as a Chromium browser extension, often named "MS Heartbeat" or "System Heartbeat." It is not on the Chrome Web Store. It finds its command server through Amazon S3 addresses produced by a time-based domain-generation algorithm (DGA) that switches address every 30 minutes, and it passes commands on to the other two tools.

SNOWGLAZE is a Python tunneler for Windows and Linux. It opens an authenticated WebSocket tunnel to attacker infrastructure on a Heroku subdomain and works as a SOCKS proxy, letting the attackers route their own traffic into the internal network.

SNOWBASIN is a Python backdoor that runs a local web server, usually on port 8000. It runs commands, takes screenshots, reads files and stages data for theft.

To survive reboots, the attackers placed a shortcut in the Windows Startup folder and created two scheduled tasks. One launched a hidden, "headless" Edge window that loaded SNOWBELT; the other cleaned up stray headless Edge processes.

From one PC to the domain controllers

With a foothold, the attackers scanned the local network for ports 135, 445 and 3389, which Windows uses for remote management, file sharing and Remote Desktop. They ran Microsoft's PsExec tool through the SNOWGLAZE tunnel to list local administrator accounts, then opened a Remote Desktop session to a backup server.

On the backup server they used Windows Task Manager to dump the memory of LSASS, the Windows process that holds login credentials, and uploaded the dump through the file-sharing service LimeWire. Password hashes from that dump let them sign in to the domain controllers without cracking any passwords, a technique known as pass-the-hash. There they downloaded the forensic tool FTK Imager and used it to copy NTDS.dit, the Active Directory database, along with the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives. Those files also left through LimeWire. Security software on the domain controllers recorded the attackers taking screenshots of the Edge and FTK Imager windows.

Google says UNC6692 does not overlap with the groups known as ShinyHunters or Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters.

What defenders can check

Every stage ran through services companies already trust: Teams for the approach, AWS S3 for hosting and commands, Heroku for the tunnel and LimeWire for the stolen files. Blocking by domain reputation alone would have missed most of it. Google's advice is to look beyond process monitoring and connect what happens in the browser, in local Python environments and in outbound cloud traffic.

The checks below follow from the report, with the matching MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs.

What to checkMITRE ATT&CK
Teams chats and invitations from outside the organizationT1566.002
AutoHotkey or unsigned programs downloaded from S3 bucketsT1105
New Startup-folder shortcuts and scheduled tasksT1547.001, T1053.005
Edge started with headless or load-extension flags, and browser extensions not on an approved listT1176.001
WebSocket traffic to unfamiliar Heroku subdomains, and S3 addresses that change on a scheduleT1071.001, T1090
Any LSASS memory dump, including one made through Task ManagerT1003.001
PsExec and Remote Desktop use between internal machinesT1021.001, T1021.002
Large uploads to consumer file-sharing services such as LimeWireT1567.002

What to watch next: more attacks that open with a chat on a trusted work tool, and command traffic moving to whichever cloud services defenders are not yet watching.

This article was updated on Oct. 9, 2026, to correct the date of Google's report to April 23 and one MITRE ATT&CK technique ID, and to add sources.

Sources

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